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ABSTRACT

Early sociological literature on subcultures was
formed and directed by the work of Albert K. Cohen.

Cohen

(1955) proposed that gang subcultures were ■ the result of

ineffective family supervision, the breakdown of parental
authority, and the hostility of the child toward the
parents.

In The Subculture of Violence (1967), Wolfgang and

Ferracutti proposed that violent activity among humans is
responsive to specific sets of circumstances, in which

violence becomes the expected reaction to certain
environmental stimuli.

Wolfgang and Fefracutti's work

focused primarily on deviant subcultures, with criminal
members.

More recent literature has focused on "occupational
subcultures" created by the jobs people perform.

These

subcultures are not necessarily criminal or deviant,

however, they still have many of the characteristics of the
criminal subcultures such as shared sentiments, beliefs,
and customs.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide another type

of assessment of the subculture, specifically; an in-depth

111

analysis of the subculture within the United States Marine
Corps.

This analysis attempts to bring the' traditional

literature of criminal subculture and the subculture of

violence together with more recent literature of

occupational subculture to explain many of the behaviors ,
exhibited by Marines.

■'

This study questions whether

domestic violence rates within the Marine Corps are an

example of some of the deviant activities identified by the
more traditional subculture literature.
This thesis concludes that

;

the United States Marine

Corps is a subculture of violence according to the

traditional research on subcultures presented by many early
scholars.

Further, the Marine Corps has many of the

characteristics discussed in more recent findings on
occupational subcultures.

The prevalence Of violence is

demonstrated by the high rates of domestic assaults.

This

thesis suggests that the Marine Corps must take steps to
foster an environment which does not

condone violence in

family settings and introduces broader training situations
which are not limited to wartime scenarios.
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CHAPTER ONE

Marine Corps and Subculture Thdory

INTRODUCTION TO SUBCULTURE THEORY

People who form a unique group within a given culture
are called a subculture (Kappler, Blumberg, & Potter,

1993). The sociological definition of subculture is a group

of peers who share many characteristics of society, but
have separate,, distinct values that make thdm unique as
compared to the larger culture (Kappler, Blumberg, &
Potter, 1993; p. 141).

Early sociological literature on subcultures was
formed and directed by the work of Albert K. Cohen.

His

book. Delinquent Bovs (1955), focused on how a delinquent

subculture could begin (Williams & McShane, 1994).

Cohen's

work studied juvenile gangs, describing them as
''malicious," and "negativistic."

Cohen (1955) proposed a

definition of gang subculture where its membiers are the
result of ineffective family supervision, tbe breakdown of

parental authority, and the hostility of the child towards
the parents.

Cohen proposed that juveniles join gang;s to achieve a
status that they can not achieve in the larger, more

dominant culture.

Cohen believed that when juveniles

become frustrated because they can not achieve a

respectable status in the middle class world, the gang
becomes a solution.

status.

The gang can quickly provide them a

This status is easily achieved in comparison to

the effort it would take to assimilate into the dominant
culture.

Subculture implies that there are value judgements or

a social value system which is apart from and a part of a
larger or central value system (Wolfgang & Ferracutti,
1967).

In a subculture, certain types of conduct are

expected.

The way a person is to act under certain

circumstances becomes the rule, or the norm.

are called conduct norms.

These rules

Conduct of an individual is,

then, an external exhibition of sharing in values (Wolfgang
& Ferracutti, 1967).

The purpose of this thesis is to provide another type

of assessment of the subculture, specifically, an ih-depth
analysis of the subculture within the United States Marine

Corps.

This analysis attempts to bring the;traditional

literature of criminal subculture together with the more
recent literature of occupational subculture discussed in

chapter two to explain many of the behaviors exhibited by
Marines.

Some studies have concluded that basic training in the

military can result in the transfer of violent responses to
family interactions (Eisenhart, 1975).

The Marine Corps

domestic violence rate, when compared to the other

services, is an example of this.

Chapter three uses the

Marine Corps' domestic violence rate as an example of
how the Marine Corps fosters an environment for its Marines
that creates a subculture of violence.
MILITARY SUBCULTURE

An example that seems to accurately exhibit
characteristics of a subculture is the United States Armed

Forces.

The conduct norms of the military are very

distinct and different than the rest of society.

Also,

with the conversion to an all volunteer force, the U. S.

military has lost many of the characteristics that had
previously made the military installation a community and

it began to take on features characteristic of modern
industrial occupations (Segal, Lynch, & Blair, 1979).

The

military is no longer a calling, but an occupation.

Recruits undergo a personal transformation during
basic training.

There, they receive more than just

training, they are ingrained with a sense of service,
honor, and discipline.

It is at boot camp that the conduct

norms of the military begin to take form.

All hair is

shaven from" each recruit's head, all personal effects are

taken away, and the values of the subculture begin to be

instilled.

The self-interest of the individual becomes

second to that of the institution they come to know as the

military.

Service members become convinced they are

selective, better, and above all, different.

The military is the nations' force in readiness.
This belief is perpetuated through training as well as
fostered by the media and the,entertainment industry.

Many

motion pictures as well as newspaper and magazine articles
reinforce what the military is supposed to be and how its
members are supposed to act.

Almost all of them send the

same message: service members are supposed to be tough and
aggressive.
The effect of the media and entertainment industries

on the image of service members was explored by James
William Gibson in Warrior Dreams: Paramilitarv Culture in

Post-Vietnam America (1994).

Gibson evaluated and

critiqued several films made during the late 1970s and

1980s, mostly action-adventure films, and described how
they created and communicated an American war culture.
In these films Service members are nearly always portrayed

as virtuous defenders of a just cause, and war seems safe,
even attractive (Gibson, 1994).

Gibson refers to such

films as Rambo. Dirtv Harrv. Patriot Games. and Lethal

Weapon to show how the violence of war is glamorized and

paints a picture that is not representive of the actual

destructive nature of military combat.
In the military, great emphasis is put on its members
to conform to the conduct norms of the subculture.

A

military unit, regardless of size, is a disciplined family
structure, with similar relationships based on mutual
respect among members.

It is believed that issues and

problems which tend to lessen a units' effectiveness must
be addressed and resolved.

If a service member is having

troubles, and those troubles affect the performance of the
unit, he or she will receive pressure from the unit to
resolve the issue.

This pressure may lead to increased

frustration, aggression, and ultimately, violence.
The subculture of the military is not isolated to just
the service member.

Each and every member of a service

person's family is also within the military subculture.
Military families are subjected to many of the same

experiences as their civilian counterparts, however,
military families experience stressors unique to their
particular situation.
Low pay, having dependents to support, and the high
cost of housing today create a great deal of pressure in

many military families lives.

For example, a service

person just out of basic training in 1994 earned $854.40
per month, which is $213.35 per week, and $10,994.20
annually (Marines, 1994).

Military spouses may feel the

need to contribute financially to offset the low pay.

However, spouses often face a difficult challenge when they
try to seek employment.

Because of the frequency of

relocating, spouses are often unable to establish careers.
This may create a significant amount of friction and
resentment in a relationship.

Not being able to contribute

financially may develop low self-esteem in some spouses,

they may feel even more trapped, and dependent on their
spouse.

Sixty-one percent of all military members have a

family (U.S.D.O.D., 1993).

Both during basic training and

tours of duty, military men and women are separated from

family members for extended periods of time.

This

separation may make a parent less involved in the lives of
the children, as well as less involved in the relationship
with their spouse.

Additionally, reunification can be as

stressful as it is joyful.
Packing up your possessions and moving to another town
may be stressful for anyone.

It often means leaving

friends behind and no longer having the support of family
members.

Mobility may also involve additional expenses

which can exacerbate an already stressful financial
situation.

Military personnel often feel isolated from their

family because of long hours and temporary separations.
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Service members and their families are also physically
isolated from the surrounding communities, living on
installations, behind fences, and inside of gates usually

maintained by armed guards.

Further, communication

barriers add to an already frustrating lack of contact with

family members.

During basic training and tours of duty,

the isolation and communication barriers are at their

greatest.

Many military men who have served overseas have
married women from other countries, which introduces

culture and life-style differences and creates additional
barriers to communication.

This usually includes lack of

support from friends and family for the spouse, which in

turn creates more dependence on the relationship.

The

military family is isolated and removed from their hometown
where other family members and friends can provide
emotional support.

When the military family travels or is

transferred overseas, many problems similar to those
discussed above can create stress within the family:
isolation, lack of support from friends and family,
difficulties in acculturation, and increased physical and
emotional dependency on the relationship.

The activities of a military member are closely
monitored by his or her superiors.

During basic training,

field maneuvers, and combat situations, service members

live and work together.
supervised.

Their activities are continually

If there are problems at home or at work, the

commanding officer usually knows about them.
Many in the military describe a double message they
receive from command or the military system in general.
The first message, "Your family is recognized in that we
will offer Services for family members to help you keep
everyone healthy and happy at home."

On the other hand,

the second message is, "When it comes right down to it,

your work is more important than your family.
not want you to bother us about them."

We really dp

Of course, the

degree to which these messages are expressed varies from
commander to commander; however, the consensus is that

these dual messages do exist in one form or another.
In recent years, there is increased stress due to the
uncertainty associated with force drawdown.

As of December

31, 1994, the services had a combined strength of 1,584,232
people on active duty, which was 8,132 fewer than November
and about 91,000 fewer than in 1993 (Navy Times, 1995; p.
28).

The Presidio Base Closure Evaluation (1992) found

that Over the last four years many civilian jobs have been
cut and military members have been called in as
replacements, often in understaffed offices and in jobs for

which they had no previous training.

Increased pressures

and future uncertainty place stresses On families.

The

Presidio report found that these stresses often take their
toll in incidents of family violence, child abuse, and

alcohol and drug abuse.

Additionally, when civilian jobs

are cut, military members become even more isolated and

less integrated with the civilian communities.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARINE CORPS SUBCULTURE

With deployment rates far above those of the other

'

services and an increase in small, urban conflict

throughout the world, the Marine Corps, in particular, is
even more vulnerable to these unique stressors.

In 1993,

seventy-eight percent of all officers and sixty-eight
percent of all enlisted Marines were away from their
families for over thirty days.

Marine Corps spouses are

especially young, with one-third between the ages of
seventeen and twenty-four.

Sixty-eight percent of all

Marine Corps families have children under the age of

eleven, and Marine Corps families move more frequently than
the other services, about every 2.4 years (Marines, 1994).
The Marine Corps presents a unique opportunity to

analyze both the traditional and more recent research on
subculture.

Being a Marine is an occupation, and the

Marine Corps subculture is truly an occupational subculture
with common attitudes and beliefs created by the job.

Being a Marine is a distinct identity because of the
character of the Corps.

Subculture theory in general, and more specifically

the subculture of violence theory, help explain how violent

activity among humans is responsive to specific sets of
circumstances.

The behavior Is learned and shared in a

cultural setting, and violence becomes the expected
reaction to certa.in environmental stimuli (Shoemaker &

Sherman, 1987).

Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracutti

developed a theoretical framework for the theory in their
book. The Subculture of Violence (1967).

Violent

subcultures place positive value on the use of violence to
resolve personal problems.
The subculture of violence theory is an attempt to

explain violence among specific categories of people who
are thought to exhibit particularly high rates of violence.
Wolfgang and Ferracutti suggest that a subculture of
violence is likely to exist among societies that are

characterized by "machoism," or the equation of maleness

with aggression, and societies that are characterized by
"frontier mores," where the rule of "gun and fist" are
idealized.
DISPERSION AND HOMOGENEITY

Subcultures are characterized by lack of dispersion.

Subcultures are often isolated in certain geographic areas,
with definite boundaries.

When one lives and works upon a

military installation, they are removed from the dominant
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culture, they are geographically separated from the

general public.

Although Marines and their families are

stationed around the world, as figure one demonstrates,

when compared to the other services, the Marine Corps is

unquestionably much less dispersed.

Figure one

shows that the Marine Corps has only 18 installations, as
compared to 82 for the Army, 86 for the Navy, and 97 for
the Air Force.

The Marine Corps is much smaller than any of the other
services, with 174,507 personnel, which is less than half

of any of the other services (Figure 2).

The small

population demonstrated in figure two suggests that the
Marine Corps may be less socially active than the other

services, particularly when one considers that this small
number of Marines is only disperesed throughout eighteen
installations world-wide.

The lack of dispersion and small population

demonstrated in figures one and two makes the Marine Corps

less socially integrated in the larger surrounding

community and perhaps much more socially inactive than any
of the other services.

Marines will meet fewer people and

be stationed at fewer installations than any of the other
service members.

Marines and their families have a much

better chance of being stationed at the same base several

times throughout a Marine's career.

11

Marines and their
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families are much more likely to live near and to meet and

work with the same people time and time again.
The Marine Corps is the only service to have
twenty-four hour a day military police presence at the
entrances to all of their installations.

This "closed

gate" policy leads to lack of socialization with the
surrounding civilian communities, further isolating Marines
and their families.

This sends a message that the Marine

Corps is interested in keeping those not in the subculture
away from those who are.

It is in homogeneity that the subculture has strength
and durability (Wolfgang & Ferracutti, 1967).

Members of a

subculture are most often very similar with regard to race,

ethnicity, and gender.

The most obvious characteristic of

homogeneity within the Marine Corps is the fact that it is
almost entirely male.

In 1994, the representation of women

in the Department of Defense Armed Forces was twelve

percent.

The Marine Corps had by far the lowest percentage

of women (4.3%), while the Air Force had the highest
(15.3%) (Figure 3).

The Marine Corps' low percentage of

women demonstrated in figure three makes it much more

homogeneic than the other services.
The overwhelming majority of Marines are concentrated
in the lower pay grades, with eighty-three percent of
enlisted Marines.between the paygrades of El to E5.
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evidence linking crime and economic inequality is strong,

particularly when analyzing the subculture of violence.
Marvin Wolfgang's study of youth crime in Philadelphia
found that when the city's youths were divided into two

groups of higher versus lower socioeconomic status (SES),
the youths with the lower SES committed substantially more
criminal activity (Currie, 1985).
The military is clearly a subculture in the most

traditional sense.

In the Marine Corps, behavior is

developed as a result of learning and adjusting to the

environment produced by the Marine Corps.

From the minute

a recruit steps off the bus at recruit training unfil the

day he/she is discharged (and probably even after that),
this environment is unavoidable.

The Marine Corps has the characteristics of a
subculture of violence (such as its homogeneity with regard

to age, sex, income, and lack of dispersion).

This chapter

suggests that as traditional subculture research indicates,
the subculture of the Marine Corps has the potential to
cause deviant activities.

The problem being investigated

is how the violent training of Marines effects the lives of
Marines and their families, and in turn, how that effects

the mission of the Marine Corps.
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CHAPTER TWO

Related Sociological Perspectives

There are several theories and perspectives that are

related to the subculture of violence theory that help
explain and define violent subcultures and their
characteristics.

This chapter reviews this literature and

attempts to show how the Marine Corps has many of the
characteristics commonly found in some of the related

violent subculture theories and perspectives.

^

FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION HYPOTHESIS

One explanation of why violence occurs in a subculture
is based on the theory that frustration often provokes an

aggressive response.

The occupation of soldiering can be

much more frustrating than that of civilians, as noted in

chapter one.

Steinmetz and Straus (1974) found that the

more normal the aggressive behavior is defined within the

occupational role, the greater amount of violence there
will be.

Aggression is the essence of the Marine Corps.

The inherent nature of Marine Corps operations and training
requires that Marines have the ability to behave

aggressively.

This is explained perfectly in the mission

of the Marine Corps rifle squad: "To locate, close with.

17

and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver (FMFM 1-0)."
From boot camp on, at every level of training. Marines are

taught aggressiveness.

This pro-aggressiveness attitude is

reinforced from the very top of the rank structure to the

very bottom.

For example, in a recent interview. Sergeant

Major Lewis G. Lee, the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps
(the highest ranking enlisted Marine) said, "Marines are
naturally aggressive, and we have to encourage that (Navy
Times, 1994)."
ENVIRONMENTAL THEORIES

According to environmental theories, the environment

that the Marine Corps creates for its Marines may be one of
the causes of the subculture of violence.

Every service is

based on discipline, honor, and obedience to orders.
However, the Marine Corps, in particular has a world
renowned reputation as being the most disciplined and

demanding of all the services.
The slogan, "First to fight," has appeared on Marine
recruiting posters ever since World War One.
"Leathernecks," the Marines' long standing nickname was

bestowed upon Marines because the original Marine uniform
had a leather neck piece which protected the neck from
sword slashes.

"The Scarlet Trouser Stripe," worn by

officers and noncommissioned officers is in honor of Marine

officers and noncommissioned officers who were killed or
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wounded during the battle of Chapultepec during the Mexican
War.

"Band of Brothers," this slogan recognizes that a

brotherhood concept depends on all members belonging.

These slogans and traditions are just a few examples of the
environment which is commonplace throughout the Marine

Corps and helps to create and encourage aggressive
behaviors.

The primary goal of Marine Corps leadership is to
instill in all Marines the fact that they are warriors
first (FMFM 1-0, 1995).

Marines are taught that the only

reason the United States of America needs a Marine Corps is

to fight and win wars.

Everything else is secondary.

Feared by enemies, respected by allies, and loved by the

American people. Marines are a "special breed" (FMFM 1-0).
It is these guiding beliefs and principles that influence
Marines attitudes, and regulate their behavior.

This matter of being different than any of the other
services is at the very heart of the Marine Corps.
A sense of elitism has grown from the fact that every
Marine, whether enlisted or officer, goes through the same

training experience.

Only the Corps requires uniform

training for all its members.

Both the training of

recruits and the basic education of officers have endowed

the Corps with a sense of cohesiveness enjoyed by no other
American service.

The determination to be different has
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manifested itself in many ways over the years, but most of

all, to an unyielding conviction that Marines exist only to
fight.
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

Symbolic interactionism maintains that it is not
possible to understand crime merely by studying criminals,
nor can one study violence without considering the

environment that develops the aggressive behaviors (Void,
1979).

Therefore, one who is considered deviant in a given

society depends very much on the society itself.
In the Marine Corps, violent, aggressive behaviors are
not considered as deviant as in society as a whole.

Marines are taught to act and behave in violent, aggressive

ways and these behaviors are positively reinforced,

supported, and rewarded.

Furthermore, non-aggressiveness

represents a clear and present danger (Eisenhart, 1975).
In symbolic interactionism, meaning is regarded as the
central concept i:p the explanation of behavior, and the

influence of the psychology of sociological conditions must
be assessed in terms of the meaning those conditions have
for the individual (Void, 1979).

To a Marine, violent

behavior "means" less than it does to others.

Military

basic training, in general, creates those meanings.

The

plausibility of this hypothesis was explored by Ekman,
Frieson, and Lutzker (1961) who, while studying
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psychological reactions to infantry basic training,
administered the MMPI to recruits in the first, fourth, and

eighth weeks of basic training.

The change in the shape of

the profiles suggests that aggressive, impulsive, and
energetic features became more prominent, and that recruits
became less prone to examine their own responsibility for
conflicts, and more ready to react aggressively (Ekman,
Frieson, & Lutzker, 1962).

This study was administered to

only Army recruits; however, the psychological agenda of
aggression is more clearly etched and blatant in the Marine
Corps (Eisenhart, 1975).
,

■

■

■

V'

Individual action is a construction and not a release,

being built up by the individual through noting and

interpreting features of the situation in which he acts
(Blumer, 1969).

Marines "construct" a definition of

aggression that is tolerant of violence, and this
definition, over time and continuous reinforcement, becomes

real.

Certain types of behavior begin to symbolize

aggressive behavior.

These symbols, or interpretations,

define violence and aggression as acceptable acts.

This

interpretation is not an automatic response, it is

formulated through self-interaction.

When a Marine is

engaging in an act, he interprets the act and develops a
meaning for it.

With regard to violence, the Marines'

meaning is that it is acceptable.
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Society's reaction to an individual's behavior is the
most important element of symbolic interactionism.

If

society reacts positively to an individual's behavior,
the individual is more likely to continue acting in that

manner.

The Marine Corps subculture responds favorably to 

aggressive, violent behaviors.

Aggressive behaviors may be

further instilled during training scenarios that require

aggressive behaviors.

Eisenhart (1975) illustrates this

with what he was told as a recruit on the bayonet field

upon his last lesson, "The next time you are in a bayonet

fight, one of you will die and that will be the one who is
not aggressive enough".
CORRECTIONAL BOOT CAMPS

Correctional boot camps offer an opportunity to
demonstrate how military style boot camps help create the
subculture of violence.

Correctional boot camps generally

involve a short period of incarceration with an intensive

regimen very similar to military boot camps.

However, the

"recruits" are offenders, usually first time offenders

and emphasis is on strict discipline, physical training,
drill and ceremony, military bearing and courtesy, physical

labor, and punishment for minor misconduct.

The idea is to

turn lawbreakers into disciplined, authority respecting men
(Morash & Rucker, 1990).

The important element for the current discussion is
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that correctional boot camps offer the opportunity to study

whether boot camps alone lay a foundation that sets the

stage for a subculture of violence.

Although correctional

boot camps do not provide training in the use of weapons,
and/or physical assault, they promote an aggressive mode of

leadership and conflict dominated style of interaction that
could exacerbate tendencies toward aggression (Morash &
Rucker, 1990).

Studies of correctional boots camps indicate that at

the very least, military boot camps do not make offenders
any less violent than they were before the boot camp.

An

evaluation of two-hundred eighty-one graduates of a Florida
correctional boot camp found little difference between

their performance and a control group: twenty-five percent
were rearrested over the next twenty-five months, compared
with twenty-eight percent of the control group (Walker,
1994).
Further research will tell us more about the

effectiveness of correctional boot camps.

However, for

purposes of the current discussion, there are differences
between correctional boot camps and military boot camps

that renders them incomparable.

Correctional boot camp

graduates often return to the same neighborhoods with the
same bleak prospects and delinquent peers that may have led
to their initial arrests (Walker, 1994).
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These

neighborhoods are often characterized by bad economies and

high crime rates.

Although not by design, a correctional

boot camp offers nothing positive at the end, while
military boot camps offer entry into a career.

Most

importantly, military boot camps offer entry into the
military subculture, where the aggressive behaviors taught
at boot camp are rewarded and supported, while correctional
boot camp graduates return to neighborhoods, where the
positive aspects of their experiences are negated by peers
and family.

The message being sent in correctional boot camps is,

"Play the game and you get out early" (Salerno, 1994).
Offenders know that all they need to do is get by and they

will be free at an earlier date.

In military boot camps,

however, recruits view their harassment as necessary to

accomplish some worthwhile goal (Salerno, 1994).
OCCUPATIONAL SUBCULTURES

"Occupational subcultures" are subcultures created by

the jobs people perform.

These subcultures are not

necessarily criminal or deviant; however, they still have

many of the same characteristics as criminal subcultures
such as shared sentiments, beliefs, and customs.

Occupational subcultures do not have geographical
boundaries as do many delinquent subcultures, they are more

often bordered by the job.

Police and correctional officer
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subcultures are examples of occupational subcultures.

A

common value that both police and correctional officer
subcultures share is bravery.

The potential to become the

victim of a violent encounter, the need for support by
fellow officers during such encounters, and the legitimate
use of violence all contribute to a subculture that

stresses the virtue of bravery (Kappler, Blumberg, &
Potter, 1993).

Similar to military personnel, police and

correctional officers must insert themselves into dangerous
and violent situations and encounters that ordinary

citizens are not required to do (Singer, 1993).
All occupational groups undergo a socialization

process, through informal gatherings such as "coffee pot
stories" or "scuttlebutt."

However, few occupational

groups rival the intensity with which the Marine Corps
develops the subculture of violence.

Few occupational

groups can compare to the regimented system by which the

Marine Corps instills its conduct norms.

Military

sociology is unique and different.
The occupation of police officer, however, does have

very similar characteristics to those of the military
subculture.

A very important similarity between the

military subculture and police subculture is that both

occupations require an intense training evolution prior to
obtaining the job.

The military has its boot camp and the
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police have their academy.

Both are isolated, intense

programs where the conduct norms of the subculture begin to
be taught.

Part of the controversy in occupational subculture
literature is whether personality traits of the members are

similar prior to indoctrination, or developed on the job.
As stated earlier, Ekman, Friesen, & Lutzker (1960), found

similar aggressive behaviors among military recruits.
Similarly, Reiss and Bordua (1967) report many significant

differences on personality trait scores between a group of
police recruits at the beginning of training, but few

significant differences in comparison with a group of
experienced police officers.

Moreover, the recruits scores

were similar across four geographically separated cities.
These findings suggest that in both the military and the
police, personality traits, attitudes, and beliefs are
developed as a result of the occupation.

The police are a generally homogenous group arid, as in
the military, women are not represented in police work in
proportion to their percentage of society.

In 1985, women

constituted five percent of the police work force while

constituting fifty-one percent of the population (Garrison,
Grant, & McCormick, 1988, p.34).

Studies show that in both the military and in police
work, the central problem women face comes from their male
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counterparts.

Janus, Lord, & Power (1988) found sixty-nine

percent of women police officers reported the public's
attitude toward them was the same or equally supportive as

their male contemporaries.

However, less than perfect

relations with male officers were revealed, with fifty-five
percent reporting that they had been assigned a demeaning
detail solely because they were women (Janus, Lord, &
Power, 1988, p.126).
Similar to the findings of women in police work,
Larwood, Glasser, & McDonald (1980) found that women were

viewed as less reliable than men in nontraditional military
specialties.

Further, they found that the longer men are

in the military, the more negative they became toward
women.

Both the military and police lack females in command
positions.

In 1994, only two percent of all general

officers were female, and the Marine Corps had only one
female general officer (Marines, 1994).

Warner, Steel, &

Lourich (1989) found that among more than two hundred

cities studied, representation of women on city councils
plays a major independent role in estimating the level of

utilization of women as police officers.

They found that

the higher the percentage of women on city councils, the
higher the utilization rate for women officers.
Police officers are isolated because their work
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carries into their off duty hours.

Some people may not

socialize with police because of the jobs they perform.
Police show an unusually high degree of solidarity, which
stems from the dangers associated with the job.

The

conclusion reached here is that the personalities of police
officers differ from the rest of the population in many of

the same ways as the military subculture.
While the military subculture and the police
subculture seem to have many like characteristics, one
distinct difference is significant.

Research on the police

subculture is rather extensive, while the military

subculture has been practically ignored.

Police

researchers identified the problems created by the

subculture, and many departments have used those research

findings to develop programs that deal with the problem.
Community-oriented policing has helped create a better
relationship between the police and the communities for
which they serve.

Physical ability tests and entrance

standards have been changed to make the requirements equal
for all applicants.

Affirmative action programs have

allowed more minorities and women to fill the ranks.

As more research on the military subculture is
established, perhaps the Department of Defense will also be
able to establish policies and standards that will help
ease the troubles faced by service members and their
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families.

This is particularly important in the face of

studies such as Segal, Lynch, & Blair (1979) which
indicates satisfaction among members of the armed forces is
significantly lower than that of civilians.

Correctional officers also possess a distinct

subculture that is similar to the military subculture.
Kauffman (1988) interviewed correctional officers at three
different correctional facilities and found characteristics

similar to those discussed here describing military
subcultures.

The officers considered group solidarity

essential not only to the accomplishment of shared goals,
but also to their very survival as individuals.

As a

group, they were willing and able to bring considerable
pressure on members to conform.

The demographic

characteristics of correctional officers are also similar

to that of the military.

Kauffman (1988, p.24) found most

of the officers she studied were young, white men who had
no formal education beyond high school.
In chapter one, it was noted that military life
presents several stressors unique to members of the

military and their families.

Some of these stressors were

low pay, family separation, isolation, and lack of support
from the institution of the military.

Long, Shoudsmith,

Voges, and Roache (1986) studied correctional officers and

compared them to a control group of Army personnel.
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A

conclusion which may be reached from the findings of this
study is that correctional officers produce significantly
more stress reactions than does a group of Army personnel.
This is an interesting finding in light of the fact that
there are several similarities between the two professions.

Many prisons are located in remote, rural areas, and often
times the officers and their families live in the same

neighborhoods.

There may even be special living

arrangements where only prison staff can live in a specific

neighborhood.

This is very similar to the military

installation.

Much like the military, prison staff is

almost completely closed off from the free society (Fox,
1983).

Long, et al. (1986) concluded that the correctional
officer subculture was the reaction of the "person" to the

"social environment."

This is the same way by which the

military subculture has been formed.

As the military

member enters the "institution" of military, their entire

life becomes the result of working and living in the
military subculture.
SKINHEAD SUBCULTURE

The American Skinhead subculture offers the most

recent opportunity with which to compare the Marine Corps
subculture.

Mark S. Hamm provides an analysis of the

American Skinhead subculture in American Skinheads: The
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Criminology and Control of Hate Crimes (1993).

Hamm's work

suggests that subcultures are constantly being formed and

evolving.

Subcultures may be a very important element of

all societies.

More than anything else, skinheads are depicted as
vitriolic racists (Hamm, 1993).

Skinheads have earned

their title from their shaven heads, and the term has come

to symbolize young, white males who behave violently
against minorities simply because of their race or

ethnicity.

Skinheads have been the center of recent media

attention, which has depicted them as a neo-Nazi gang
responsible for many beatings, and even murders of
minorities.

It is not the purpose of the current discussion to
explore the causes or beliefs of the skinhead subculture.
Instead, Hamm's (1994) work provides a more recent example
of a violent subculture, one that is alive and well today,

that has many of the same characteristics of the Marine
Corps.
Hamm (1994) found the conduct norms of skinhead

subcultures to be transmitted most intensely through peers.

Violence is the norm among skinheads, non-violence is a
form of deviancy.

Therefore, violent acts are expected or

one will feel as though he is not doing his part, as if
he does not belong.

Further, Hamm found that skinheads
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felt more comfortable behaving violently with other
skinheads nearby.

Violence became an act of imitation, and

group reinforcement for this behavior came to define

violence as acceptable in the minds of the skinheads (Hamm,
1994).

'

This current, modern-day subculture develops its

conduct norms the same method by which the Marine Corps
develops its conduct norms.

During training. Marines are

"performing" for other Marines.

Acts of non-aggression are

considered weak, and dangerous.

When Marines witness other

Marines behave aggressively, and then are rewarded and

praised for their actions, they imitate that violence in
hopes of receiving the same rewards and praises.

From the

moment a recruit enters boot camp, he or she will never be

alone.

He or she will constantly be in the presence of

other members of the subculture, where they will feel more

comfortable when behaving aggressively.
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CHAPTER THREE

Domestic Violence as a Product of the Subculture

This chapter uses domestic violence rates in the

military as a way to demonstrate the military subculture,

particularly the Marine Corps subculture of violence.
Domestic violence can be used in the theoretical context

discussed here to show that the Marine Corps has many of
the characteristics of subcultures.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A NATIONAL PROBLEM

Child abuse, spouse abuse, and other physical violence
occur in more than half of all U.S. households (Kadushin &

Martin, 1988).

An estimated fifty million people fall

victim to physical harm at the hands of another family
member each year.

In this country, a woman is more likely

to be assaulted, injured, raped, or killed by a male

partner than by any other type of assailant (Brown &
Williams, 1987).

Suzanne Steinmetz and Murray Straus (1974) have noted:
"It would be hard to find a group or an institution in

American society in which violence is more of an everyday
occurrence than it is within the family."

Violence not

only causes physical harm in families; each incident also
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weakens the loyalty, attraction, and trust between members
that are basic to positive family functioning (Zastrow,
1993).
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A MILITARY PROBLEM

Domestic violence is indeed a serious national

problem, and recent attention has been given to domestic
violence and military personnel.

Just as domestic violence

remains a problem for all Americans, members of the
American Armed Forces also face the dilemma of what to do

about domestic violence.

Figure four shows how abuse cases

within the Department of Defense has increased since 1988.
Figure four is particularly alarming considering that
the total Department of Defense population has been

reduced every year since 1988 (Navy Times, 1995).

While

the population shrinks, the amount of abuse cases is
climbing.

The Marine Corps has a particularly difficult

challenge, with the highest rates of spouse and child abuse
when compared with the other services.

Figures five and

six show that the Marine Corps' rates of child and spouse

abuse are the highest of all the services.
LACK OF PROSECUTION OF MARINE CORPS OFFENDERS

Since Marines are taught that violent behavior is

good, they develop a different meaning of violence than
most people.

Violence may "mean" less than in the other

services or as in society in general.
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It may not be
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regarded or defined as abnormal.

This different definition

of violence ultimately leads to the lack of any deterrence
of domestic violence in the Marine Corps.

In most civilian

communities, if an individual is arrested for domestic

assault, he is taken to jail, at a minimum for the night,
and faces stiff penalties as well as the humiliation of

being arrested and going to jail.
of deterrence.

This provides some form

However, in the Marine Corps, if a Marine

is apprehended for a domestic assault, he is released that
night to his unit representative.

The unit representative

will recommend to the Marine that he spend the night in the
barracks.

Usually the Marine will spend the night in the

barracks, and the following day the domestic assault will
be on the blotter, and the Marine's unit commander will

receive a copy of the incident report.
At this point it is left up to the unit commander to

punish as he/she sees fit.

However, often there is very

little, if anything, done.

The Marine may receive formal

counseling, but most of the time there is no further
disciplinary action taken.

Marines can be punished by commanders with

non-judicial punishment (NJP).

NJP refers to a limited

range of punishments which can be imposed for disciplinary
offenses by a Commanding Officer or Officer in Charge to
members of their command (Military Justice, 1992).
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Article

128 of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is

entitled, "Assault (Spouse and child abuse)."

Therefore,

there is an article that allows the commander the authority

to charge and punish Marines for this crime.
A Marine has the right to refuse NJP in lieu of a

Trial by Courts Martial.

A Trial by Courts Martial is a

formal hearing much like a normal civilian trial, but the
jury is made up of senior enlisted and Marine officers.

Usually, however.

Marines accept NJP.

At NJP the

commander is the judge, jury, and executioner.

He/she

determines guilt or innocence and punishes as he/she deems
appropriate.

At NJP the commander's authority to punish is

more restricted than if the Marine were to elect to go to a

Trial by Courts Martial.
In essence, NJP is the Marine Corps form of plea

bargaining, and therefore, is a regular occurrence.

Examples of violations for which Marines commonly receive
NJP are; drunk and disorderly, dereliction of duty, or
unauthorized absence.

Rarely, however, is a Marine given

NJP for a domestic assault.

The Department of Defense

.

Family Advocacy Committee's Research Subcommittee (1993)
initiated action to complete a survey of all of the

branches of the military.

The survey counted the number of

cases prosecuted under the UCMJ for domestic violence
offenses (article 128 or other appropriate articles of the
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Manual for Courts Martial).

Also surveyed was the number

of cases which had administrative separation as a result of
domestic violence assaults.

The Family Advocacy Program

Managers for each branch of the services worked with their
headquarters Staff Judge Advocates (Marine lawyers) to
count the number of cases in 1992.

The survey identified 19,281 substantiated domestic
violence cases for 1992.

The study counted 250 cases as

prosecuted under the UCMJ and 482 cases were identified as
having been administratively separated.

The total number

of cases found in this study indicates that a very small
number of cases faced legal action for abusive behavior.
The lack of prosecution lends support to the theory of

symbolic interactionism.

The entire system, including the

Military Police, Staff Judge Advocates, and unit commanders
seem to define domestic violence as almost non-criminal,

allowing it to happen without punishment or any other kind
of deterrence.

Systematic and thorough investigation and

prosecution of domestic violence acts under the UCMJ would

appear to be a secondary response to this criminal and
violent behavior.

It appears, from the low numbers of

cases prosecuted or administratively separated, that
diversion into treatment remains the primary intervention
for domestic violence offenders.
VICTIM MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PUNISHMENTS
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There seems to be a misconception by the victims of

abuse in the Marine Corps that if their spouse is

identified as abusive, he/she will face stiff penalties.
While very few Marines are formally punished for abusive

behaviors, one analysis found Marine corps victims to be
more afraid of military consequences for their spouse than

of any other consequence (Caliber, 1994).
In September, 1994, Caliber Associates prepared an

analysis of the Marine Corps spouse abuse responses to a
Department of Defense victim intake survey.

The abuse

victims study was designed to examine both perceptions of
the consequences of reporting abuse as well as actual
system responses to reported abuse by military sponsors
(Caliber, 1994).

Analysis of the survey data indicates a

number of significant differences between the responses
from Marine Corps spouse abuse victims and spouse abuse
victims from the other services.

The Caliber (1994)

analysis found that about two-thirds of all Marine Corps
victims were very or somewhat afraid that their spouse's

military career would be in trouble, their spouse would be
punished by the military, their spouse would be kicked out
of the Marine Corps, or that it would be unpleasant for

their spouse at work.
The survey respondents were asked, "How afraid are you
that any of the following will happen because your problem
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is known by the military?"

When compared to the other

services, the Marine Corps victims are much more afraid of

the military consequences.

Table one shows that in every

single aspect examined, the Marine Corps victims were much

more more likely to be affraid of the military
consequences.

Perhaps the most important aspect examined

was that almost half of all Marine Corps victims feared,
that their spouse would hurt them, while only about a third
felt this way in the other services.

This may indicate

that Marines exhibit aggressive tendencies while in the
home much more frequently than members of the other
services.

Table one indicates that Marine Corps victims strongly
believe their spouse will suffer disciplinary action for
abusing them.

However, the Department of Defense

statistics on prosecution rates clearly show that this is

not the case.

What is it, then, that makes Marine Corps

victims more fearful?

It may again be the environment.

The same environment that makes Marines more aggressive and
violent may make the victims more fearful.

Marine spouses often hear the stories of Marines being

punished swiftly and harshly for acts that to them seem
ridiculous.

These punishments create an environment that

leads the spouses to believe a Marine will be punished
harshly for a crime as serious as spouse abuse.
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Force

TABLE 1

VICTIMS' FEARS OF CONSEQUENCES BY MILITARY SERVICE

USMC

ARMY

NAVY

worse at home

52%

40%

34%

31%

Spouse will hurt her

47%

33%

27%

22%

Spouse will be kicked
out of the military

63%

54%

45%

54%

Spouse will leave her

44%

29%

25%

25%

52%

41%

35%

36%

bad of her

33%

12%

9%

13%

Friends will think
bad about her

32%

15%

6%

7%

57%

43%

29%

40%

VICTIMS' FEARS

AIR FORCE

Things will get

Will not be able to

support self/kids
Family will think

Too many people will
hear about it

Note. From Caliber Associates (1994).

Analvsis of the

Marine Corps spouse abuse responses to the department of
defense victim intake survev.
(Contract No.

M00027-94-M-2658).
Printing Offices.

Washington, DC: U. S. Government
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drawdown has, made promotion and retention very difficult.

Spouses believe a black-mark such as a domestic assault on
a Marine's record will surely force them out of the
service.

This will create an even worse economic situation

for the family, and this is the last thing the spouse
wants.

Also, one of the most common punishments given at

NJP is to garnish wages.

Top-ranking officers publicly proclaim to take a tough
stance against domestic violence.

On May 11, 1993, the

Commandant of the Marine corps issued the following order
to all General Officers, all Commanding Officers, and all

Officers in Charge, "We must maintain a coordinated

response in which family violence is reported to proper
authorities whenever suspected...commanders
should...initiate administrative or disciplinary

proceedings to hold offenders accountable for their
actions."

It would appear as though the Commandant is publicly
proclaiming that the Marine Corps is taking a tough stance

against domestic violence.

Essentially, he is ordering

officers to prosecute cases against Marines who behave

violently while in the home.
happening.

Quite simply, it is not

But if the commandant said it should happen,

most Marines and their families believe it is happening.

This helps create the environment that sponsors fear and
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develops these misconceptions regarding punishment.
AGE GROUPS AND SOCIO-ECOMOMIC STATUS OF MARINE CORPS
ABUSERS AND THEIR VICTIMS

A subculture may be made up of all ages, however, the

violence is usually most prominent in a limited, segmental

age group (Wolfgang & Ferracutti, 1967).

The Caliber study

found that in each service, the majority of abusers were in
the paygrades E4 to E6, but Marine Corps abusers were
consistently more likely to be in the El to E3 paygrades
(Table 2).

Table two shows that Marine Corps abuserS fit

the description given by Wolfgang & Ferracutti with
regards to the violence being most prominent within a
certain age group.

Forty-three percent of the Marine Corps is within the
El to E3 paygrades (Marines, 1994).

Almost all Marines are

promoted above the E3 paygrade during a normal four year
enlistment, and most Marines enlist within a year or two
after graduation from high school.

Therefore, the

overwhelming majority of domestic violence assailants in
the Marine Corps are in a younger age group.

Table two also suggests that Marine Corps abusers are
of a lower socio-economic status.

Social class is an

important factor in many studies of violent crime, and the
subculture theory is no different.

Studies of subculture

since 1958 consistently report the same observation:
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that the overwhelming majority of assaultive crimes are

committed by persons from the lowest stratum of a social
organization (Wolfgang & Ferracutti, 1967).
Just as Marine Corps abusers tend to be younger, so do
the victims of domestic assaults (Table 3).

More than

two-thirds of Marine Corps spouse abuse victims are

twenty-five or younger, while about one-half of the victims
in the Army, Navy, and Air Force combined were twenty-five
or younger.

Conversely, eight percent of victims in both

the Army and Navy were thirty-six or older, while only one
percent of Marine Corps victims were over the age of
thirty-six.
Domestic violence within the Marine Corps is an

example that fits the subculture model theory.

It appears

as though the violent, aggressive behaviors taught to
Marines carries over into their family life.

It also

appears that the institution, the environment created by
the Marine Corps allows, and almost encourages, violence at
home.

Finally, family violence is isolated to a very

segmented group of young, economically troubled families.
IMPORTATION EXPLANATION AND SELECTION PROCESS

There seem to be two competing theories that may
explain the origins of the Marine Corps' subculture.
According to social learning theory, the majority of
violence exhibited by Marines is a learned behavior.
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This

TABLE 2

ABUSER PAYGRADE BY MILITARY SERVICE
MARINE CORPS

ARMY

NAVY

AIR FORCE

E1-E3

41%

23%

14%

13%

E4-E6

52%

68%

79%

82%

E7-E9

5%

7%

6%

4%

OFFICERS

2%

2%

1%

2%

TABLE 3

VICTIM AGE BY MILITARY SERVICE

MARINE CORPS

ARMY

NAVY

AIR FORCE

16-20

33%

16%

9%

11%

21-25

37%

41%

42%

36%

26-30

17%

24%

22%

33%

31-35

12%

10%

19%

14%

1%

8%

8%

6%

36+

Analvsis of the
From Caliber Associates (1994).
Marine Corns spouse abuse responses to the department of

Note.

defense victime intake survey.

M00027-'94-M-2658).
Printing Offices.

(Contract No.

Washington, DC: U. S. Government
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is an occupational view that suggests that the institution
of the Marine Corps assists in developing and creating
violent behavior.

The other theory is that the high rate

of domestic violence in the Marine Corps is directly

correlated with recruiting practices.

This "importation"

explanation suggests that the Marine Corps tends to recruit
and enlist individuals who have a predisposition for
violence.

This theory is similar to the early literature

by Cohen (1955) in which juveniles join gangs as a result
of ineffective parental authority, family supervision, and

shared experiences of^failure in traditional middle-class
social systems.

Perhaps the Marine Corps subculture is the result of
both schools of thought.

If so, the Marine Corps recruits

those with a predisposition for violence and then develops
the violent traits even further.

As Cohen has noted,

juveniles join gangs to achieve a status that they can not
achieve in the larger, more dominant culture.

In one

sense the Marine Corps is similar to Cohen's gang, where
violent juveniles view the Marine Corps as a means to
achieve a status that to them seems unattainable in the
civilian world.

Marine Corps recruiting practices support this

importation explanation, and the high rate of violence in
the Marine Corps may be directly related to recruiting
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practices.

While the other services have changed

recruiting practices to stay competitive with civilian

employment opportunities, the Marine Corps recruiting
practices have remained the same.

The other services

advertise enlisting for the purposes of "learning a trade"
or "learning a skill."

However, the Marine Corps continues

to present the image of "warrior" or "knight" in most
recruiting media.

While the Marine Corps mission requires

combat effectiveness, today there is a need for more

intelligent and technically proficient recruits.

The

message the Marine Corps may be sending is, "come join our
gang, come join the Marine Corps to vent all of your
violent, aggressive tendencies, and we will pay you for
it."

Individuals with a attitudinal predisposition for

abuse may find this appealing.

Also, Marine

Corps recruiting practices legitimize violence by
indicating, "this is the reason why we want you, and you
better not let us down."
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CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusions

COMPARISON TO NATIONAL PROBLEM

The historical sequence of events concerning the
United States Marine Corps' policies and actions to stop
domestic violence seems to replicate the problems faced by
the nation's criminal justice system over the last twenty

years.

While the nation's criminal justice system's

response has evolved dramatically over the last two
decades, the Marine Corps response has remained the same.

The Marine Corps has failed to shift to defining domestic
violence assaults as a crime.

As both a crime and a social

problem, offenders must be both prosecuted and treated.

One of the problems for the Marine Corps in addressing this
critical issue of domestic violence lies in its failure to

adopt the same changes many of the leading states and
cities in the country have adopted.

Domestic violence is a

crime under specific state criminal penal codes, and it is
a crime under article 128 as defined in the Manual for

Courts Martial.

To be effective in addressing this

problem, the Marine Corps must change its policies and

practices.

The Marine Corps must adopt a pro-prosecution
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policy calling for systematic, universal investigation and
prosecution of the perpetrators of such acts.

The Marine Corps faces a unique opportunity to become
the leader ambng the armed forces.

Legal, investigative,

and command personnel must work together to develop the

prosecution policies and practices required to stop family
violence in the Marine Corps.

Specifically, the Marine

Corps must increase the conviction rates of accused
batterers; and enhance penalties for convicted batterers.

This tough position must be communicated to all Marines,
and Marines must be trained to know what the Marine Corps
response will be.
PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE MARINE CORPS

Outside of combat, reacting quickly and intensely
with anger and aggression is usually problematic.

The

Marine Corps needs to capitalize on the fact that most of
its abuse cases are among young couples who have not yet

had time to establish patterns of chronic and escalating
abuse.

The Marine Corps should place substantial emphasis

on primary prevention to sensitize young Marine couples to
the definitions, symptoms, and dynamics of abuse.

Marines

and their spouses need to know that the Marine Corps
defines family abuse as criminal.

This could be done with

a violence prevention program at recruit training to
educate recruits about domestic violence and provide them
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with skills to help them avoid destructive behavior.

Also,

this program would educate recruits on the possible

disciplinary actions that could be taken if they are
arrested for a domestic assault.

This training should stress that even though Marines
are required to behave violently, this behavior must be
contained to training and the battlefield.

The training

should show that it is inappropriate to respond to every

day circumstances as if they were situations encountered in
the life-threatening context of combat.

Specifically,

Marines need to be shown that violence against their

defenseless spouse and children is not appropriate.
Marines are constantly put in training situations that
require quick decisions to be made at a moments notice
under the most stressful of situations.

This decision-

making training should be carried over into the family

setting.

Marines should be shown that it is feasible

to control emotions in a family setting because it
is similar to the requirements on the battlefield.

The

distinction between home and training needs to be clearly
defined.

This distinction can be established with broader

training situations that are not just limited to wartime,
scenarios.

A generalized uncertainty of the consequences, as well
as the concern about negative career impact to the service
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member, inhibits many spouse abuse victims in the military
from coming forward.

The Marine Corps needs to acknowledge

that these young women are frequently scared and
confused--scared of both their husbands and the Marine

Corps institution, which seemingly have total control over
their lives.

Commanding officer sanctions will only work

to the extent that commanding officers, who have authority
to impose sanctions, understand and begin to sanction
Marines for family violence.
DETERMINE ORIGINS OF SUBCULTURE

Perhaps the Marine Corps should set out to clearly

determine whether the subculture is occupational or
traditional.

That is, does the Marine Corps tend to

recruit and enlist individuals who have a predisposition

for violence before they enter the Marine Corps?

Or, is

the high rate of violence a result of the environment

created by the Marine Corps?

This could be determined by

conducting studies of recruit's awareness, understanding,
and attitudinal predisposition to violence.

The test

should be administered to new recruits entering boot camp,

and again after the adjustment has taken place.

This

pre-test/post-test should be designed to capture
information of family abuse history, definitions of
violence, attitudes towards violence, and some
socio-economic information.
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The Marine Corps should analyze the entire Marine
Corps criminal justice system, and identify how it
contributes to the subculture of violence.

This includes

the Military Police, Staff Judge Advocate, and Unit
Commanders.

Each of these components continues to allow

family violence to happen by unofficially defining it as
non-criminal, thus contributing to the subculture of
violence.

Marine Corps military police training and practices
should be analyzed with regard to handling domestic
violence situations.

Military police investigators should

be trained to conduct more effective evidence collection

and to respond sensitively during victim interviews.
The Marine Corps should perhaps capitalize on the
established research and literature on subcultures to aid

them with overcoming violence.

The literature presented

here on police subcultures is an example of a similar
institution that is taking steps to overcome an identified

problem.

The Marine Corps should take steps similar to

those of police agencies across the country.
The Marine Corps should identify factors that create
or contribute to the subculture of violence.

The Marine

Corps has an opportunity to lead all the other services on
this issue, and the Marine Corps' leadership should

advocate and fight to develop solutions to handle this
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devastating social problem.

If the Marine Corps leads, the

other services will follow, and ultimately, these
recommendations may make the Marine Corps even more

effective in combat, by making the individual Marine's
family life more pleasant.
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